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Full resolution (TIFF) - On this page / på denna sida - IV. Economics - 11. The Southern Plantation Economy and the Negro Farmer - 9. The Plantation Tenant
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^48 An American Dilemma
start the next crop year with a deficit, they have nothing to live on during
the winter. The average debt for these tenants varied between $89 and
$143.’^^ As hinted at before, it is probable that indebted and propertyless
tenants are often able nowadays to get rid of their debts simply by moving
to another place. This, at least, is likely to be the case when the tenant is
an inefficient worker, and the landlord, for this reason, is not interested in
keeping him and considers the expense for collecting the debt higher than
it is worth. The extremely high number of tenants who have stayed less
than one year on their present farms is enough to indicate the relatively
unhampered movements of most tenant operators. The practice of forcing
an indebted tenant to stay on the plantation in order to work off his debt
certainly became less prevalent during the period of relatively abundant
agricultural labor which lasted from the beginning of the depression until
the present war boom.’^^ We do not know whether the present shortage
of farm labor has brought about any new increase in such debt-peonage.
What we do know is that the whole legal system previously gave the
tenants but little protection against such abuses and that, so far, there has
been no fundamental change in this legal system. In addition, the planter
has at his disposal all the extra-legal caste sanctions. It is certain, anyway,
that there is some debt-peonage left.’^
Apart from the legal and extra-legal pressures, the terms established in
the landlord-tenant agreements and settlements will be heavily loaded
against the plantation tenants, because of that monopolistic clement which
was analyzed even in the time of Adam Smith: the purchasers of labor
will be bound as neighbors, friends, and gentlemen not to bid against each
other for tenants. This monopolistic tendency will be particularly effective
in the plantation South where the tenants are usually absolutely unorgan-
ized, where, further, there is a racial split and usually extreme prejudice
among them, and where—particularly in the case of Negro tenants—the
social distance between employers and employees is enormous.
That such a monopolistic tendency is strong has been seen by many
observers."’’^ To begin with, no planter feels that he can afford to lose a
tenant who has started a crop. The claims on solidarity go further, how-
ever. To be a ^^tenant-stealer” is traditionally considered a bad thing."^®
According to the prevailing custom, no landlord Is supposed to accept a
tenant whom the previous employer does not agree to release.*^^
The basis of this custom is a feeling, on the part of the planters, of a
sort of collective ownership of the workers in the community. The resent-
ment against any outsiders coming in for the purpose of hiring labor Is
even stronger, if possible.’^® The hostility against outside labor agents grew
particularly strong during the period of the First World War, when
Northern industry made its strongest bid for the Negro agricultural
worker. Several states enacted laws against such practices.
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