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Full resolution (TIFF) - On this page / på denna sida - IV. Economics - 12. New Blows to Southern Agriculture During the ’Thirties: Trends and Policies - 3. The Role of the A.A.A. in Regard to Cotton - 4. A.A.A. and the Negro
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2s6 An American Dilemma
New Deal most trouble.’”® In 1939, however, a substantial export bounty on
cotton was instituted. This, and perhaps still more the increased consump-
tion during the present war, has brought temporary relief. The carry-over
has declined, but it is still significant.
Indeed, the whole program would have failed to bring about any
increase in cotton prices had it not been for the removal of surpluses from
the ordinary market. Very commendable were the efforts—now discontinued
—to increase the cotton consumption of the needy by direct distribution of
mattresses and by the Cotton Stamp Plan. Those measures, however, were
expensive in relation to their results in reducing the cotton surplus. The fact
that the cotton producer receives but 15 cents of the consumer’s dollar
spent on cotton products^® makes it much more difficult to make a cotton
distribution program effective than it is to take similar measures in regard
to most other agricultural products. Therefore, this part of the removal
program was only experimental.
Of real importance, on the other hand, have been the commodity loans
to individual farmers and associations of farmers for the purpose of encour-
aging storing (The Ever-Normal Granary Plan). These loans explain
the large carry-overs. The existence of such huge and fluctuating surpluses
means, however, that the whole system has had complete lack of stability,
which was contrary to the official purpose of the Granary Plan to keep the
supply in balance. Had it not been for the present War, there could ulti-
mately have been but two alternatives: either further drastic cuts in the
cotton acreage, or collapse of the whole program.® In either case, the Negro
would have been hurt severely.
4. A.A.A. AND THE Negro
It is something of a problem, however, that most of the reduction in cot-
ton acreage was carried out before 1935, whereas the decrease in number of
Negro and white croppers and of Negro cash and share tenants did not
start to become really significant until after that year. Of course, there is
nothing unnatural in a certain time-lag between acreage curtailment and
effects on employment. The intensification of cultivation of the cotton land
not eliminated by the A.A.A., the increase in certain other crops, and the
uncertainty about the permanence in the change may have contributed to
a certain delay in the reorganization of the labor force. The Supreme Court
decision of 1936, invalidating the first A.A.A. program, and the actual
occurrence of an all-time peak in cotton production in 1937 justifies, to a
degree, the hypothesis that the change may have had the appearance to
many planters of being only temporary. By letting the employees share
•A third alternative would have been to rely consistently on export subsidies} but such
a policyt more likely than not, would have been neutralized in the long run through retalia>
tory measures of foreign competitors.
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