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Full resolution (TIFF) - On this page / på denna sida - IV. Economics - 17. The Mechanics of Economic Discrimination as a Practical Problem - 1. The Practical Problem
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Chapter 17. A Practical Problem 381
Race prejudice on the part of the whites is the usual explanation given
for these various types of job limitations. But to relate discrimination to
prejudice means little more than to substitute one word for another.*
Leaving this problem aside for the moment, we may observe that race
prejudice and discrimination, in the economic sphere, operate principally
in three different ways:
(1) Many white workers, even if they think that Negroes generally
should have a fair share in the job opportunities in this country, tend to
be opposed to Negro competition in the particular localities, industries,
occupations, and establishments where they themselves work.
(2) Some customers object to being served by Negroes unless the Negro
has an apparently menial position.
(3) Many employers believe that Negroes are inferior as workers, ex-
cept for dirty, heavy, hot or otherwise unattractive work. Perhaps even
more important is the fact that they pay much attention to the attitudes of
both customers and white workers.
All these conditions, in many different ways, are self-perpetuating. Let
us, in this context, just point to one element in this circular process.** Sup-
pose that an individual employer would entirely ignore the race of those
applying for work at his shop and would consider just the individual capac-
ities of the job-seekers, white or black. The fact that most other employers
exclude Negroes means that the individual employer would have a dispro-
portionate number of Negroes applying for his jobs. The rumor about his
unusual behavior would draw Negro workers from other localities, and
he might soon find a majority of Negroes on his labor force. The conse-
quence might be that his estabJishment would be shunned by white labor,
and it is not impossible that the result would be an almost all-Negro shop.
The best he can do if he wants to favor the Negro, without having to face
such consequences, is to fix the percentage of Negro workers j
but that
means giving up the principle of selecting Negro and white workers on an
individual basis.
White workers, of course, are up against the same problem, and they
have even more reason to be concerned about it than have the employers.
Every individual municipality, and even every state, is in a similar situation.
Let us imagine that a certain state, by means of strongly enforced legisla-
tion, would succeed in abolishing most racial discrimination in the economic
sphere. If similar strong measures were not taken simultaneously by other
states as well, the result would be a tremendous increase in in-migration of
Negroes to that state. Thus^ the very fact that there is economic discrim-
ination constitutes an added motive for every individual white grouf to
maintain sttch discriminatory fractices. Discrimination breeds discrimination.
* See Chapter 3. text footnote in Section 1, and Section 5.
**
For certain other elements in this vicious circle, see Section 6 of this chapter.
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