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Full resolution (TIFF) - On this page / på denna sida - IV. Economics - 19. The War Boom—and Thereafter - 3. Government Policy in Regard to the Negro in War Production
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41 6 An American Dilemma
that Navy yards and Army ordnance plants tend to be less exclusionistic
than are most private establishments in the same lines of work. We also
mentioned the abolishment of photographs from job applications in the
federal civil service, and the increase in Negro clerical and secretarial
employment in certain federal agencies.® The improvement, however, is
by no means general. Brown and Leighton make the following criticism:
The committee had not, as late as July i, 1942, certified to the President any
case of job discrimination in the government itself, although, according to one mem-
ber of the staff, they had found almost as many cases of discrimination in federal
departments as in war industries.^®
Even if, at the end of the war boom, the Negro should find that he
had gained only some “strategic” footholds in certain previously all-
white occupations, the significance of this progress should not be mini-
mized. “Strategic gains” means that there are so many more practical
demonstrations of Negro performance in lines of work where no employer
previously tried to give the Negro worker a chance. Further, the Execu-
tive Order and the President’s Committee represent the most definite break
in the tradition of federal unconcernedness about racial discrimination
on the nonfarm labor market that has so far occurred. They represent
something of a promise for the future. Even if the government should
temporarily relax its control of the labor market after the War, it is quite
possible that there will be some kind of continuation of these efforts.
The President’s Committee cooperates with the special branches for
Negroes and for other minority groups within the War Manpower Com-
mission. Some of the other federal agencies, as well, have been cooperating
to eliminate economic discrimination. In many instances, however, the
cooperation has left much to be desired. Two such cases need particular
emphasis: the vocational training program and the Employment Service.
In spite of the President’s Order there is still widespread* discrimination
against the Negro in most war production training programs, even though
some improvement has been brought about. In December, 1940, only
1,900, or 1.6 per cent, of the trainees were Negroes in the so-called pre-
employment and “refresher” courses organized under the auspices of the
United States Office of Education and the Employment Service. Taking
the whole period July i, 1941, to April 30, 1942, Negroes still constituted
only 4.4 per cent of all trainees enrolled in corresponding educational
programs.”’ Thus, the Negro, as yet, is still far from having a 10 per
cent representation—in spite of the fact that the need for additional train-
ing is much greater among Negroes than it is among whites. This dis-
crimination has been particularly pronounced in the South. In January,
1942, for instance, there were some Southern states, like Florida and
“See Chapter 14, Section 8.
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