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Full resolution (TIFF) - On this page / på denna sida - V. Politics - 21. Southern Conservatism and Liberalism - 4. The Changing South
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464 An American Dilemma
Now Washington is the main ^^buyer^^ of the South, And Washington
usually seeks to extend its assistance regardless of race.
Washington is not consistent in its racial policy, it is true. The New
Deal, whatever its leadership and its aspirations, is bridled by shrewd poli-
ticians who must be just as reluctant to break openly with Southern conserv-
atism as with the corrupt city machines in the North. But at the same time
these politicians have to look out for the labor vote and for the Negro
vote in the North, which again strengthens the forces working for nondis-
crimination in the New Deal. There is, in the game, plenty of room for
skillful log-rolling} the Southern conservatives in Congress and at home
will often succeed in blocking rules and policies drawn up by the New
Dealers to protect the Negroes’ right to their equal share. The fight goes
on under cover. But sometimes it flares into the open, as when Southern
reactionary congressmen utilize their strategic committee positions to defeat
or restrict some proposal of the New Deal. This blocking of social reform
by Southern congressmen and the more general condition—which existed
long before the New Deal—for Southern congressmen to exert a dispropor-
tionate influence on legislation because of their longer tenure and the
consequent importance of their committee assignments and prestige, is one
of the main reasons why the Negro ’problem is a national one and not
merely a sectional one. Northern politicians are becoming aware of this fact
before the Northern public.
If, in the main, the New Deal has to deal tactfully with Southern con-
gressmen, the latter cannot afford to break off entirely from the New
Deal either. The Democratic party is their means of reaching out into
national politics. And, besides, they have to watch their home front, where
the New Deal is getting popular with the masses. The race issue, in these
New Deal measures, is never an isolated element which can be cut off; it
is always involved in the bigger issue of whether poor people shall be
helped or not. The fundamental fact is that the South is poor and in clear
need of social assistance and economic reform. To this must be added a
personal factor of considerable weight. Roosevelt is not just another
Democratic President. He has succeeded in becoming truly popular among
the common people in the South, and he has taught them to demand more
out of life in terms of security and freedom from want. He has acquired
such prestige that the epithet ‘^nigger lover” simply cannot be applied to
him. Even the most conservative Southerner will scarcely dare to come out
against him personally in the same way as do Republican conservatives in
the North.
In this way Southern political conservatism as a whole, and even on the
race point, has to retreat and compromise. Meanwhile, the entire South
is experiencing the benefits of the various federal policies. A general trend
of centralization of governmental functions—from local governments to
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