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1056

(1944) [MARC] Author: Gunnar Myrdal
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1056 An American Dilemma
situation, as indicated by the etymological connection of their prefixes to the word “bad.”
A great arbitrariness—allowing for the more specific biases of a personality and a
cultural setting—is present in deciding upon just what shall be considered as equilib-
rium and what disequilibrium in a process of social change. The following quotation
has been chosen to illustrate the working of a political bias through the vehicle of such
terms, not only because the bias—directed against the Negro as his interests are com-
monly conceived—is expressed in a particularly blunt form, but also because it happens
to be from the pen of a Negro sociologist:
In the face of these opposing views, then, conclusions concerning the effect of education
upon Negroes during this period may be reserved. If education brought disorganization
among the former slaves, it may be counted as a liability. If, on the other hand, it served
as an outlet for feelings that might otherwise have been directed into politics, where
discord might have resulted, it may be counted on as an asset. The situation doubtless
varied in different places at different times—assisting or retarding adjustment in areas
where the one effect or the other, already mentioned, preponderated.*
Similarly, if a thing has a “function” it is good or at least essential.** The term “func-
tion” can have a meaning only in terms of a presumed purpose; if that purpose is left
undefined or implied to be the “interest of society” which is no further defined, a con-
siderable leeway for arbitrariness in practical implication is allowed but the main direc-
tion is given: a description of social institutions in terms of their functions must lead
to a conservative teleology. If there is a “cultural lag,” there is likewise a presumption
that the elimination of the lag is desirable. While social processes and mores may not
be good, in terms of certain arbitrary standards, they are believed to exist or develop
with an inevitability that defies all efforts directed toward their modification.
These and similar static terms constitute much of the basic descriptive and theoretical
terminology in all the social sciences. It is certainly an important task of self-scrutiny
for social science to determine why such terms and not more dynamic ones have been
given such a strategic position in social science thinking. The present author has sug-
gested above that the origin of social science out of the philosophies of Enlightenment
and the greater “realism” of the laissez-faire wing of early liberalism is of central
importance. The very fact that the evaluative nature of these terms has gone almost
unnoticed suggests that the explanation of their choice must go deep into the roots of
Western culture. Whatever the reason for their predominance, the fact that such terms
—^without much care to preserve for them a strictly theoretical meaning—^are widely
used to describe much of social life and serve as keystones in theoretical explanations of
social structure and change, inserts into social science an implicit static and fatalistic
value premise. The use of such terms makes it appear that a given situation is desirable
or inevitable without the explicit specification by the social scientist of what he considers
desirable or of the possibilities of the modification of “inevitability.”
There is nothing to be criticized when a scientist explicitly states that he hopes a
certain situation will develop, that such a situation is a good one according to certain
standards which he sets up, or that a certain situation or development is inevitable beyond
•Bertram W. Doyle, The Etiquette of Race Relations in the South (1937), p. 127.
• How easily even a radical social scientist may slip over to the expression of approval of
something that he says has a function is illustrated by Durkheim’s discussion of crime and
punishment: Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (1938; first edition,
1895), translated by Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller, pp. 66-70.

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