Full resolution (JPEG) - On this page / på denna sida - IX. The Balkan war, 1912
<< prev. page << föreg. sida << >> nästa sida >> next page >>
Below is the raw OCR text
from the above scanned image.
Do you see an error? Proofread the page now!
Här nedan syns maskintolkade texten från faksimilbilden ovan.
Ser du något fel? Korrekturläs sidan nu!
This page has never been proofread. / Denna sida har aldrig korrekturlästs.
i io
THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix.
to arrive more quickly at the rallying-point. My wife
and my youngest daughter, who were returning from
Russia vid Bukharest and passing through the whole of
northern Bulgaria exactly at this time, told me that at
each station there were crowds of women, old men, and
children escorting, with flowers, songs, and jokes, their
sons, husbands, and brothers who were joyfully going
off to the decisive conflict with the time-honoured enemy.
The same thing was told me by travellers who had
crossed Serbia. The day after the one on which the
mobilisation was ordered war became inevitable. If
the Bulgarian or Serbian Government had wished to
obey the injunctions of the Powers and—not to
demobilise—but only to check the course of events, it would
have inevitably provoked a revolution, and the armed
troops would have crossed the frontier on their own
initiative.
The die was cast. As to us, representatives of the
Great Powers in Sofia, we could only be spectators of
military deeds and of the first decisive encounters.
I often wondered at the time and afterwards how the
Central Empires could have allowed the Balkan States
to go to war without at least trying to prevent it by
more prompt and effectual means than the
representations of united Europe and her platonic threats. I
explain the fact by the complete confidence possessed
by Berlin in the victory of the Turks over the Allies.
Such a victory would necessarily lead to diplomatic
negotiations between the Powers, and during these
negotiations the Central Empires would have the
enormous advantage of being on the side of the victor. The
unexpected, and what is more, rapid and decisive,
success of the Serbian and Bulgarian arms
flabbergasted Berlin and Vienna to such a pitch that they had
not even time to agree together to prevent this success.
It became henceforth necessary to change the sphere
of action to that of the inevitable competition between
the victorious countries, and to postpone the decisive
blow to another day and a more propitious moment.
<< prev. page << föreg. sida << >> nästa sida >> next page >>
