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208 THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST [chap. xiii.
interests of the Powers of the Entente and of Serbia,
to see Bulgaria deprived of nearly all her conquests in
Thrace. And even in settling the demarcation question
of the Bulgarians with the Serbians, Greeks, and
Rumanians, it would have been good policy to spare
the self-esteem of the Bulgarian people a little, and to
consider their real interests.
It was precisely in this way that at the beginning we
viewed the task of the Peace Conference of Bukharest.
In the first place, I received the order to declare to the
Bulgarian Government from His Majesty the Emperor that zve
would not tolerate any humiliation or excessive weakening
of Bulgaria. Then M. Sazonoff protested most
vehemently against the advance of the Turkish troops in
Thrace and their reoccupation of Adrianople,
Kirk-Kilisseh, etc. When the Ottoman Ambassador, Turkhan
Pasha—in parenthesis, a worthy and respectable old
diplomat—went to see Sazonoff, by order of the Porte,
in order to obtain our benevolent consent to the
retaking of Thrace by the Turks, the Minister answered
that he refused to discuss that question with him ; that
he would discuss it most thoroughly with his Russian
colleagues at the War Office and the Admiralty. Finally,
the Russian Minister to Bukharest, M. Schebeko, when
receiving the Bulgarian delegates, gave them some
hope, and promised to do all in his power to secure
to Bulgaria part of the acquisitions purchased with so
much Bulgarian blood in 1912. During the nine days
that the Conference lasted, M. Schebeko played a
prominent part in the negotiations, or rather the attributes
of the part were willingly assigned to him by both sides,
who frequently applied for his intervention, but who
did not follow his advice.
Shortly before the Bukharest Conference, Russian
diplomacy had suggested taking as a base for
demarcation between the former allies a frontier line
following the course of the Bregalnitza, that of the Vardar
(to a certain point), then the chain of Belachitza, and
finally the lower course of the Struma, a line which
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