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258
The king’s argumer.ts for
an offensive war. HISTORY OF THE SWEDES. Good understanding with
Denmark interrupted.
[1628—
who was skilled in seamansliip. On the other
hand, this antagonist hath innumerahle ways and
means to set ’^n foot a naval armament, and liath
already begnn to equip liimself for the sea. And
he that hath the sovereignty of the world wants not
for men who have naval skill and knowledge, so
that it is undeniable, if we leave him time, he will
be superior to us. What would it
help us then if
we held Stralsund, while the enemy was lord of the
sea ? It is also not possible to destroy his ships in
the havens by means of ours; for where he hath
his ships lying, according to what I hear from the
king of Denmark,. he hath so fortified himself that
we cannot come to harm him. Wherefore if we do
not seek by land to wrest the ports from the enemy,
I see no means whereby we may defend the king-
dom in the long run. For these reasons we must
remove the seat of the war to some other quarter
than Sweden, for we are no where weaker than in
Sweden. You know w^eli what a wide extent of
coast and how many liarbours we have to guard.
What you remark, that no means were to be hoped
for in Germany, I cannot altogether deny; but if
we there gained the upper hand, I cannot believe it
would be so bare but that some resources might be
found. In any case, Spence gives me hope that
something might be expected from England. Ca-
merarius advises us, that the States-general press
for the renewal of our alliance. The Hanse Towns
are undecided. If any good fortune showed itself
on otir side, help were not to be despaired of. This
hath moved me with all earnestness to urge that the
army described in the roll *
may be gotten on foot;
and although you set forth its weakness, and the
two strong armies of the enemy, you must consider
that the hostile armies are encumbered with wide
districts, and many garrisons which must all be
supplied with troops. Besides, the .enemy’s affairs
depend much on his fame; and if he should lose
the masterdom of the soil they would go but badly.
For the rest, Tilly’s army is far distant, so that the
">
"We cannot take the field with a strong army, for we
must keep much infantry in Sweden on account of the Danes,
so that we must employ foreigners mostly. We have on the
roll 15,000 men and 9000 horses." Gustavus Adolphus in
the Council, Oct. 27, 1629. Palmsk. MSS.
8 To the chancellor, Jenkceping, March 5, 1629. Ex
manuscripto regis Gust. Ad. in the Palrask. MSS. t. 37,
p. 1925. We have, as usual, only extr.icted the chief por-
tions. The correspondence on the same subject between
the king and the chnncellor was continued. Sept. 20, 1629,
the king writes to Oxenstierna,
" Because we are not yet
fully resolved whether we will take the German expedition
on ourselves, or in another manner form a treaty with the
emperor, we request your counsel thereupon at the soonest."
Reg.
7 The same confidence is expressed in the letter to the
chancellor of Dec. 26, 1628 :
" We have here annexed a plan,
by which you may perceive the practicability of the whole
work. And althou’^h the means appear not to be reckoned
upon longer than for four months, \et if we obtain any firm
footing for the war, God and time will show how we may
strengthen ourselves further."
8 " I advised his majesty, of happy memory, that he
should not take his army on German ground ; had his
majesty followed my counsel, he would have become arbiter
of the whole north." Axel Oxenstierna in the council, 1636.
To the king’s resolution he applies the terms /rt<«m, a;;.v/)o«i<;o
divina, impetii-i ingpnii.
9
M.ay 25, 162S (O. S.) the Danish colonel Hoik succoured
Stralsund with three companies of Scots, and one of Germans,
business will have been mostly over in Pomerania
ere he can be persuaded to come to the aid of
Wallenstein. What else may be accomplished or
not, God alone knoweth, to whom we look graciously
to grant will to begin, force to execute, and good
luck to end all, if it
may tend to the honour of His
holy name, and to our salvation. And you, by dis-
putation, will more easily evince the difficulty than
I the possibility; wherefore what I think to per-
form I will rather show in fact than on paper ^."
We may observe that the presentiment of vic-
tory is the real connecting link of the king’s con-
clusions ’. And thus Axel Oxenstierna, who never
altered his sentiments respecting this war, calls
the resolution to engage in it
" a destiny,
—a divine
mission,
—an inspiration of genius, but which hin-
dered the king from acquiring supreme power in
the north *." How widely foreign Gustavus Adol-
phus conceived such an object to be to the career
he was now to tread, the sequel may show.
The truce with Poland freed him from an enemy
on this side, but Denmark’s peace with the empe-
ror at the same time made the condition of affairs
ambiguous on another. In the April of 1628 an
alliance was concluded between Sweden and Den-
mark, whereby Gustavus Adolphus bound himself
to reinforce the Danish fleet during the war with
the emperor. The Swedish ships destined for
this purpose were employed in the defence of
Stralsund, an object common to both powders, but
of which the care was eventually left to Sweden
alone ^. The peace made by Denmark separately
at Lubeck in the following year interrupted the
good understanding, although an appearance of
amity was preserved. At the time, and long
afterwards, the Swedes laid it to the charge of
Denmark that the Swedish plenipotentiaries were
not received at the deliberative congress, although
this refusal proceeded from the imperialists, and
seems to have been neither unexpected nor un-
welcome to Gustavus Adolphus 1. On the other
in all six hundred men. June 20, eight Swedish ships
arrived, bringing munitions of war and the first Swedish
auxiliary troops under colonel Rosladin. July !.’, the van-
guard of the Danish fleet reached Stralsund with one thou-
sand men, fresh troops ;
but when the Scottish colonel
Leslie brought (17th and 18th July) a new band of Swedish
auxiliaries. Christian IV. caused the Danish garrison in
Stralsund to be taken on board the fleet, and himself at-
tempted a landing in Pomerania, but being routed at Wol-
gast by Wallenstein, was compelled to re-embark with loss.
In the instructions for Alexander Leslie, as commandant of
Strasburg, it is ordered that the oflRcers of the German
troops in Stralsund shall take the oath of fidelity to the king
of Sweden, and not more than three hundred men of the
Danes shall be allowed to remain in the town under any
pretext. September 17, a convention on this matter was
made between the Swedish chancellor and the king of Den-
mark. Count Nicholas Brahe was appointed assistant to
Leslie. In reference to the latter, who afterwards rose to be
a Swedish field-marshal, we find it provided that,
" because
he cannot read, count Brahe shall rehearse the king’s orders
to him." Memorial and letter to Leslie and count Nicholas,
Dec. 1, 1628. Reg.
’
Salvius, who was secretary to the legation sent, was
instructed for three contingencies:—!. If the imperialists
should protract matters, or refer them to the emperor. 2. If
they i)resently refused the whole commission uncourteously
and contumeliously. 3. If they should allow the Swedes to
treat as mediators, or for their own interests and those of
Stralsund and Mecklenburg. If they declined the legation,
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