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1G32.]
Plans for the ejisuing
year.
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. GERMAN WAR. Winter of 1630
Operations coniinued. 265
troops in the neighbourhood, at Gartz and Greif-
feniiagen, and attempted from thence, during the
king’s absence, an assault upon the Swedish camp,
which tailed. The king himself repaired to the
coast (where Wolgast, which the enemy had re-
covered, was again reduced by siege), in order to
attack Rostock and Wisinar from the sea, and make
an incursion into Mecklenburg^; but contrary winds
hindered the fleet ’^
Moving from Stnilsund he took
Damgarten and Ribnitz, and entered Mecklen-
burg. But liere the enemy having gained time to
strengthen himself, the former masters of the ter-
ritory neither could nor dared attempt any thing ;
and duke Francis Charles of Saxe-Lauenburg, who
liad taken arms, was routed and made prisoner by
Pappenheim. The design upon Mecklenburg there-
fore was needs abandoned, and the king, who from
the delay of the Prussian troops was without hope
of bringing the enemy to a general action this year,
saw himself confined for the winter to impoverished
Pomerania ^. His letters about this time to Axel
Oxeustiema and the council of state supply the fol-
lowing explanations of his views :
" The emperor
seems indeed to incline to a treaty with us ^, but
upon no other terms of peace than that we, without
respect to our own and our neighbours’ security,
should relapse into our former incertitude. We are
of opinion, that no treaty can be concluded, unless
a new religious peace over all Germany shall be
acceded to and confirmed, and our neighbours
placed in their foi-mer condition, so that we by
their security may be secure. To which end we
find no other means than that we should beset the
emperor himself somewhat more nearly, and the
clergy withal, who are upon his side. For if we
could come to the empei’or’s hereditary dominions,
and thereby deprive him of his own means, and lop
off the contributions which he extorts from our
brethren in religion, so that the whole burden of the
war should fall upon the Popish clei’gy, then we might
win a peace for us and for our fellow-believers, by
which there were some hope of reputation. There-
fore we have projected next year to set on foot
various armies; namely, so that we with one army
under our own guidance might maintain this bor-
der of the Baltic, while Gustave Horn and Teufel
with two armies secured us the dominion of the
Oder, held Brandenburg on one side in devotion,
and might advance on the other into Silesia. With
the fourth army in Magdeburg (where the admi-
3 "Since it is of great moment to us to get firm footing in
Mecklenburg, as well for the extension of our quarters as for
the relief of Magdeburg, we have therefore resolved, in God’s
name, to go forward to Mecklenburg, and try our success
with Wismar and Rostock." The king to the chancellor,
Wolgast, Sept. 8, 1G30. Reg.
• Part of it had returned to Sweden ;
the other guarded
the coast of Pomerania after the landing, and under admiral
Blum blockaded the harbour of Wismar, where an imperial
squadron of fifteen sail lost its flagship to the Swedes in
December. Swedish Intelligencer. Compare Chemnitz, i. 91.
5 " We hoped to have the Prussian troops so early that
there would have been opportunity for us still to bring the
enemy to an engagement this autumn. But we perceive
now, that these troops can only be sent slowly and by de-
grees. We must therefore content ourselves witli these our
present scanty quarters. All Fore Pomerania is well nigh
ruined, and for the most part in the enemy’s hands. In
Hinder Pomerania also things look not well. We have little
else than the wasted islands to trust to, and from Sweden, on
account of the season, and the administration of those who
nistrator has already 3000 men and some hundred
liorses), we hope to be able to luild the Elbe, and
through this and our own army to impart both to
Brandenburg and Saxony will and opportunity to
co-operate with us. To the fifth array we are in-
duced by the archbishop of Bremen, with the
towns of Brunswick, Hildesheim, and others, which
already incline to us, and correspond secretly with
Salvius. This army must be held close to the
Weser. What is required to the accomphshment
of this plan ye see by the calculation. We will that
for the war department should be set apart the
returns of the customs, the salt licenses, 8000
skeppunds of copper, with 100,000 rix-dollars from
the rents and the cattle-tax. All the other revenues
we have assigned for the ordinary expenditure."
In the letter to Oxenstierna the king adds: " How
these armies shall be brought forward and sup-
ported, we must confess is the greatest difficulty.
Yet are we inclined to think, that if the troojis could
be levied, and every army were so strong as is set
down in the draught, tlie heads and directors of
each army luight have counsel enough to devise
means and expedients for their support at the
places to which they were appointed ’."
The blockade of Colberg by land and water, with
the operations to which it led (the fortress with a
garrison of one thousand five hundred men did not
surrender till the 2nd of March in the following
year), was the most important event of the autumn*.
The winter set in, and this year it was severe; but
with it, to tlie astonishment of the enemy, came no
repose. To winter campaigns the soldiers of Gus-
tavus Adolphus were accustomed. We mentioned
that the Imperialists had drawn together their
main body at Gartz and Greift’enhageri, on both
sides of the Oder. On Christma-eve Greiffen-
hagen was taken by storm under the orders of the
king himself, after a valiant defence by the gar-
rison, two thousand five hundred men strong, most
of whom perished. This so aft’righted the imperial
field-marshal Schaumburg (Conti’s successor in
command), that during the night he abandoned
Gartz, blew up his powder magazines, threw his
cannon into the water, and fled to Custrin (whose
doors were opened to the fugitive Imperialists,
but closed on the pursuing Swedes), in order with
the remnant of his army to wait for Tilly in Frank-
fort on the Oder". Thus ended the year 1630.
France, which had profited by the king’s ap-
remain at home, we can expect no more." To the Chancellor,
Stralsund, Oct. 31, 1630. Beg. Nov. 5, the king writes to
the Palsgrave in Sweden :
" We have needs given up the ex-
pedition to Mecklenburg, since the enemy are there so strong
that we can make no progress with the force we have here.
Part of tlie Prussian troops are now come to Stargard, pan
are on the march." Id.
6 The diplomatic transactions we pass by as of little
influence.
? To the Council of State upon the war, Ribnitz, Oct. 8;
to the chancellor upon the armies of the coming year,
Ribnitz, Oct. 1, 1630. Reg.
8 That the king towards the end of the year had an in-
tention of returning to Sweden (which, however, he relin-
quished), we learn from two orders to Fsegreus, his resident
in Denmark, of Nov. 5, and Dec. 7, 1630, to request safe
conduct for him, to pass by land through that country, in
case he could not come to Sweden by sea on account of the
winter. Reg.
!
Schaumburg’s letter to Tilly lays the blame on the utter
demoralization of Wallenstcin’s former army.
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