Full resolution (JPEG) - On this page / på denna sida - XVII. Gustavus II. Adolphus. The German War. A.D. 1628—1632
<< prev. page << föreg. sida << >> nästa sida >> next page >>
Below is the raw OCR text
from the above scanned image.
Do you see an error? Proofread the page now!
Här nedan syns maskintolkade texten från faksimilbilden ovan.
Ser du något fel? Korrekturläs sidan nu!
This page has never been proofread. / Denna sida har aldrig korrekturlästs.
1632.]
Discussion of the
policy of the GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. GERMAN WAR. operations subsequent
to the victory.
271
words,
" that he would rather congratulate him
on the victory in Vienna," but eighteen yeai’S after
his sovereign’s death he declared in tlie Swedish
council,
" if Gustavus Adolphus had betaken him-
self directly after the battle of Leipsic to the
emperor’s hereditary dominions, and laid aside his
march to the Rhine, leaving it to the German
estates to settle their affairs with one another, the
emperor would never have been able to subsist ^."
It is well known that the elector of Saxony, who
while the king was battling with the emperor at
a distance, hoped again to be able to appear in the
empire at the head of a third party, had himself
wished to make the expedition to Franconia*; and
probably this was one secret ground of the king’s
opposition to this plan, of which he merely ob-
served that he would not trust Saxony to keep his
rear safe *. He mistrusted the ambiguous policy
of the elector, and appears from that very reason to
have wished to place him in a relation of thorough
hostility to the emperor. A recent historian, who
has had access to the Saxon archives, ascribes to
tlie dukes William and Bernard of Weimar, an
important influence on the decision of Gustavus
Adolphus^. He is said withal to have been
flattered with magnificent prospects, for the self-
gain of those "who held them out. A more weighty
consideration is, that the Protestant estates as-
sembled in the convention of Frankfort on the
Maine, publicly invoked his succour ’. Three
grounds of his resolution are stated by the king
himself : he wished not to lose sight of Tilly
^
;
he
wished to possess the Catholic bishoprics for the
support of his army and his own designs
^
;
he
3 From the Minutes of Council in 1650. Palmsk. MSS.
t. 190.
•
Chemnitz, i. 216.
5 The king especially distrusted field-marshal Arnheim,
now the elector’s general, of whom Oxenstierna says, that
he laboured all his life through for a third party in Germany.
The king held him to be an indifferent general,
" better in
speculation than action" (Chemnitz, 1. c), and afterwards
demanded his dismissal.
6
Rose, duke Bernard the Great, of Saxe Weimar.
Weimar, 1828, i. 156. According to Pufl’endorf, duke Ber-
nard sought to work upon the king’s mind by hopes of tlie
Imperial dignity. It is certain that not only these princes,
but the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, George duke of Luneburg,
and others, in the grants of land and towns which they so-
licited from, the king, in fact acknowledged him as the lord
of Germany. After his death we find statements made as
to his promises of the same augmentation to different indi-
viduals; e. g. Eichsfeld, promised both to William duke of
Weimar, and George duke of Luneburg, as appears from the
Appendix, No. 119 in Von der Decken, 1. c. ii ,
where the
latter requests Oxenstierna that he may retain
" this present
engaged to him." Gustavus Adolphus appears really not to
have been very exact in his answers to such demands. But
here the scrupulo.sity on one side may correspond to that on
the other. The king wished at this time to strengthen his
alliance with Brandenburg. He commands Salvius (Quer-
furt, Sept. 18, 16.31,) to visit Berlin on his journey to Meck-
lenburg, to remind the elector of what had passed between
his majesty and him in respect to a more intimate union ;
end since now both the elector of Saxony and the dukes of
Weimar, with the princes of Anhalt, had entered into a
league with him, to proffer an alliance on the same condi-
tio-is under which it had been concluded with Mecklenburg
and Hesse ; yet Salvius might have power to modify some
articles, as the jus clienteles 3nd palrocinii, in case the elec-
tor should stickle for it. Further he mi|,’ht pray the elector
of Saxony to endure patiently for some time yet the ordinary
wished to let in the air of freedom to the Pro-
testants of Upper Germany i. It appears to us
that the question must be considered not only from
a purely military, but also from a political point
of view. In reference to the supposed results of a
march to Vienna (which both previously and subse-
quently has seen the enemy at its gates, without
Austria having fallen), we repeat here words for-
merly spoken by us: "
Posterity doubts with reason
that a struggle so complicated and far-stretching as
this could have been decided by any single blow at
any moment, if there were any other wish than that
of merely securing a share of the prey, and setting
aside all regard for the cause. In respect to what the
interests of the latter required, we dare maintain
that the sequel justified Gustavus Adolphus, and
this his minister himself was to discover. After
the death of the hero, where was it that Oxen-
stierna found sympathy and support ? Where was
it that he succeeded in forming a Protestant
league, and thei-eby averting the common danger
in the most critical moment ? Was it the Pro-
testants of North or South Germany who formed
the union of Heilbronn ? Was it in the tlien un-
decided counsels of Brandenburg, or of untrusty and
double-minded Saxony, the most powerful of our
confederates, that help was found ? No! it was
through the weaker but more sensitive of our
fellow-believers, then as now opener to every hope
of a better future, and readier of will, that this
help was compassed ; by the lesser princes, the
free nobles of the empire, the inhabitants of the
free imperial citie.t, who, in these tracts most
blended with the Catholics, had also felt the yoke
contributions, as his majesty was bendinghis march to Upper
Germany, to obtain better quarters, and would thenceforth
lighten as much as possible the burden of coutributiun and
inquartering. Reg.
? A conference was being held about this time in Frank-
fort on the Maine between the representatives of several
Protestant and Catholic states. The latter departed after
the battle of Leipsic, the former remained. "
They wrote to
the emperor to supplicate him to withdraw the troops, who
lived at their discretion among them. The emperor refusing
to rid them of these inconvenient guests, they prayed the
king of Sweden to do it, and naturally declared for him who
became the defender of their property and liberty. Thus it
was to support that declaration that the king took the reso-
lution of entering Franeonia." Francheville, Note to the
Translation of Gualdo Pricrato. p. 97.
8 " The reason why his majesty, of happy memory, did not
proceed to the hereditary dominions of the emperor, said
the king, was that when Tilly after the battle of Leipsic
turned against Brunswick, and was joined by the duke of
Lorraine with ten thousand men, he was obliged to pursue
him ; for if he had gone to the hereditary dominions, the
whole power would have fallen to Saxony." Axel Oxen-
stierna in the council, 1636. Palmsk. MSS. 190, 136.
9 See his letter to the Chancellor, Halle, Sept. 17, 1631.
Reg. It will be recollected that when the king crossed to
Germany, his future plan for the war was directed in great
part against the Popish clergy. Several circumstances be-
sides merely the support of his army spoke in its favour.
The emperor’s edict of restitution directly provoked retalia-
tion of this kind; they offered easy conquests, and the
Catholic bishoprics were good pawns for a future peace, in
which the indemnities were in fact mostly exacted from the
secularized sees.
1 " The king wished first of all to go to Thnringia, and
there bring matters to a right state; afterwards to take
his march to Francony, to give air to the Protestants in
the upper country." Chemnitz, i. 216.
<< prev. page << föreg. sida << >> nästa sida >> next page >>
