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The German Problem
When, in November of 1947, I was again in
Germany to inspect Swedish relief activities, I was
reminded more strongly than before of the global
significance of the German problem. This emphasis
was obviously due to the fact that the Germany I now
met was not the same as that which existed
immediately after the Armistice and the start of the
occupation in 1945. Germany had changed, and in most
respects this change was depressing.
Let me first record a few facts and observations
to clarify the internal situation. On my way from
Copenhagen to Hamburg, I met the chief of the
German railroads in the British Zone. He talked about
his work and his experiences connected with it. They
were rather dismal. He told me that German rolling
stock had suffered great damage during the war and
was now in bad repair. There was no way to rebuild
the cars and locomotives at the necessary rate. One
result of this, among others, was that the capacity
of German industry was more and more curtailed.
He continued that, in the Russian Zone, the
occupation authorities had removed the greater part of the
only double track lines on the more important
railroads. Efficiency had declined considerably. No
timetables were existing in the Russian Zone and trains
were coming and going without schedule.
The German railway men had their own special
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