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ENGLAND’S DECISION
3"
days. For many people this decision appeared to be
already unquestionable : the English ought to side with
France and Russia. But I did not share this
assurance. I remembered the political conflict caused between
Russia and the Central Empires by the annexation of
Bosnia. At that time I often met in Paris my London
colleague, M. Poklewski-Kozell, a man as intelligent as
he was sincere, who had made for himself an exceptional
position in the London world, and who thoroughly
understood English political mentality. I asked him
once—it was in February, 1909—why England did not
earnestly warn Germany that if her provocative policy
led to a conflict with Russia, the English would place
themselves resolutely on our side and on that of
France; such a warning, I considered, would certainly
moderate the claims and the actions of Berlin. M.
Poklewski replied that in order to issue such a warning,
the British Government would have to look on the
question of the annexation of Bosnia (without the
consent of a European Conference) as a possible casus belli.
Now this was not at all the case ; the Asquith-Grey
Government would only decide on war if Germany touched
one of the primordial principles, of which the infringement
would be intolerable to England. Remembering these
words, which were completely confirmed by subsequent
events, I did not feel at all sure of the entry of the
English into the war up till the day when the Germans
invaded Belgium; on that day I said to myself that
Belgian neutrality being undoubtedly one of the great
principles which England would never allow to be
touched, the English alliance was henceforth assured to
us ; and in fact we did not have to wait one day for it.
This was an enormous relief to me ; without the
co-operation of Great Britain I felt sure of our defeat; with it,
one could hope for much. Alas! I was still too
optimistic! It is true that I had assessed the forces and
the moral of Russia far too low; but on the other
hand, like most people in Europe, I was far from
realising the magnitude of Germany’s resources and her
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