Full resolution (JPEG) - On this page / på denna sida - XIX. Sweden in 1915
<< prev. page << föreg. sida << >> nästa sida >> next page >>
Below is the raw OCR text
from the above scanned image.
Do you see an error? Proofread the page now!
Här nedan syns maskintolkade texten från faksimilbilden ovan.
Ser du något fel? Korrekturläs sidan nu!
This page has been proofread at least once.
(diff)
(history)
Denna sida har korrekturlästs minst en gång.
(skillnad)
(historik)
Sweden and Norway profited by the situation to derive
a few advantages in the tangled question of the reindeer
forests of Finmark, and also raised the question of the
Aland Islands. By a clause added to the Treaty of 1856,
Russia pledged herself not to keep up any military
establishment on these islands, which constituted a fairly
appreciable guarantee for the safety of the Swedish
capital, situated about thirty nautical miles from the
extremity of the Aland Archipelago.
To do away with the stipulations disadvantageous to
Russia of the Treaty of Paris was, as we know, the work
of the whole long Ministry of the Chancellor of the
Empire, Prince Gortchakoff. After a long delay, in 1871,
at the Conference of London, came the elimination of the
clause, untenable for Russia, of the limitation of her fleet,
of her fortified places, and of her dockyards in the Black
Sea; in 1879, the portion of Bessarabia adjacent to the
Danube which France and England, under Austria’s
influence, had forced us to give up to the Danubian
Provinces, was restored to the Empire. But the wise
and subtle Chancellor, who could and wished to act
nobly, and was not instigated by restless ambition; the
grand seigneur Chancellor, never thought of retracting
the concession made to Sweden in 1856. He realised
that for the neighbouring kingdom this concession had
a vital value whilst it only had a passive one for Russia,
and he preferred to keep up the relations of excellent
neighbours with Sweden rather than to enjoy the small
triumph of the elimination of the last and insignificant
restrictive clause of the Treaty of 1856.
The prudent M. de Giers and his three immediate
successors took great care not to alter our policy in this
respect. But in 1906, matters assumed a different aspect.
At this moment the separation of Norway and Sweden
set the problem of the international regime of the North
Sea, a problem solved by a convention between England,
France and Germany. Analogically one might raise the
question of the regime of the Baltic Sea; and M. Isvolsky,
newly appointed to the post of Minister for Foreign
<< prev. page << föreg. sida << >> nästa sida >> next page >>
