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DUELLING
195
As long as physical force played the chief part in regulating
the affairs of Society, this was necessarily so, but since the
arm of the law and the police take the place of physical force,
and women derive the same benefits from these safeguards as
men, this sort of chivalry has become out of date and
unnecessary. The duel is supposed to be a prerogative of man,
but all that has been said about its uselessness as a true
weapon of justice in settling the quarrels and affairs of men
applies in the same way to those of women. If a woman’s
reputation has been damaged, from a dramatic and theatrical
point of view perhaps it may be desirable to fight a duel, but
a real reparation can only be secured by the law, when the
offence committed can be publicly redressed by evidence to
the contrary. If an offence committed is in itself irreparable,
it is obvious that a duel cannot be an adequate remedy, as a
duel is in itself a cataclysm, and though it may satisfy
vengeance, it cannot redress. The fact that an offender is
ready to place himself at the disposal of a man who will
shoot at him, or thrust him through with a sword, is
considered by duellists as a circumstance which must give
satisfaction to the person offended. But, after all, it is a poor
thing for some one who has suffered an irreparable wrong to
be allowed to wreak his vengeance on the wrongdoer. There
is no moral sense in it.
Of all the writers and philosophers who have expressed
themselves against duelling, Montesquieu in his " Lettres
Persanes," La Bruyere, Grevile de Girardin, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Eduard von Hartmann, and Schopenhauer, the
latter is perhaps the most convincing. He explains that
according to the tenets of the point d’honneur, honour does
not consist in the opinion of others about our moral value,
but simply in the outward acts which would imply such an
opinion, irrespective of whether such an opinion existed or
not. Others, therefore, may have a very bad opinion about
our conduct and despise us. Our honour remains untouched
so long as no one dares to express that opinion. On the
contrary, even if we by our actions and qualities win the
high esteem of our fellow-men, it is only necessary for some
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