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222 DQCUMENTS CONCEI?NING SWEDENBORG.
man in these ages v/ko theologically has no mysticism, but who, where others have a
grace point or a mathematical point, sees a world where the soul is freely at home ; where
others have a pufF of wind, sees a human spirit, &c. &c. Therefore we cannot sound the
reason of that strange perversity which calls Swedenborg mystical. Is it that he has
been where for a few centuries no one else has been, and given a clear account of that of
which the most of us professedly know nothing ?
2. "^
We object to Mr. Morell speaking of ’the frequent obscurity with which Sweden-
borg’s thoughts are expressed.’ In the first place, Mr. Morell has probably read them
only in translation. Then, as a verdict, this allegation is quite incorrect. Mr. Morell is
himself one of the clearest headed writers we know, but for clearness, where exposition
of doctrineis required, ^he is no more to be compared to Swedenborgthan crystal to diamond,
Swedenborg’s clearness is actually so great, as to have that living property of giving the
o’}:^ect seen not only distinctness but added brilliancy. It is indeed the quality of a pre*
cio«is stone—of natural truth translucent with spiritual.
3. ’**
We object to the phrase—’ the differences of opinion upon many important points,
which exist amongst his followers.’ Upon those points which his own works denote to
be most important, we do not believe there is difference of opinion among his followers.
On those points which the metaphysicians consider important, there may indeed be the
greatest difference, on account of their essential triviality. Thus, whether a man be a
BerkleisKi or a Reidist, a Platonist or an Aristotelian, in his mental temperament and ten-
dencies, is a thing doubtless very vital for metaphysics, but not so for citizenship in the
New Jerusalem, which embraces all temperaments, and only demands the development
of every man’s better part in the rejoicing pathway of the Good and the True.
4. *’
W-e object to the phrase—’ suggesting the germ of the atomic theory by pointing
out the geometrical relations existing between the ultimate atoms.’ If there be any germ
in the case, the atomic theory (as it is called) is itself but the germ of that noble fruit of
doctrine of which Swedenborg held up an outlined representation in his Chemical Speci-
mens.
5. " ’ With a mind fratight (says Mr*. Morell) with long study upon nature and her works
—with a soul habituated to deep meditation upon spiritual things—with a vivid imagina-
tion that could trace the analogies of higher truth in the dark windings of material forms
—
with a moral nature purified to virtue, and an exquisite sensibility of the whole system, he
lost himself in the visions of his own inmost soul,’
" This fine sentence constitutes one of the best specimens of anti-climax we have ever
seen; and if logic dealt with the probable, we should say the last clause of it was to the
greatest degree illogical. For ourselves, we humbly think that all the allegations in the
first nine-tenths of the sentence, are reasons why Mr. Morell should reconsider his opinion,
and ask himself whether, after all, Swedenborg did lose himself, or not ; at least, whether,
such a loss of self was not the way to the veritable heaven and the true God.
6. "* In him sensationalism, idealism, mysticism, wex-e united—the only phase through
which he never passed was that of scepticism.’ We object here, because we do not be-
lieve that Swedenborg had any sensationalism, idealism, or mysticism, in him, any more
than scepticism : be never passed through one of them as a phasis. He never proposed
to himself that any metaphysical account of things was a centre from which to think, or
that all together (eclecticism) were the way of truth. We doubt whether he could have
understood any system of the kind, however popular, or rather, whether his strong resol-
vent genius would not have detected at once the intrinsic unintelligibility of such sys-
tems. For instance, we doubt whether he could possibly have comprehended Berkeley’s
doctrine ; that is to say, we imagine that at the first glance he would have become certi-
fied of its mere mystification of plain things, and therefore all explanation would be im-
possible. For where is the use of arguing about what is seen to be dov»’nright wrong, and
to have none but an imaginary existence ?
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