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Doc. 172.] 491
ON WAR AGAINST RUSSIA .
the Roman Empire and on that of Poland, and perhaps by the
fall of Dantzic she will make herselfruler of the commerce in the
Baltic, and so forth. Still it is to be remembered on the other
side, 1. that these alliances cannot be broken up without their
uniting to keep Sweden always in such a condition, that she
could not furnish any aid to France. With all the advantage
that we might possibly gain, I cannot but see that it will be
a constant source of trouble to us , inasmuch as the whole
German Empire will be better off with the Russian alliance,
and with Sweden shorn of her strength. They would rather
see Russia than Sweden powerful, especially the German
Empire, so that they will constantly conspire to bring this
about; so much so, that if Sweden should achieve any
successes, they would be a constant source of temptation to
them to endeavour to reduce us to such a condition, that they
may reap the advantage of their alliance with Russia and
Poland. Should they, however, under existing circumstances,
feel a desire to trouble Sweden by an offensive warfare, we
should be ever prepared to defend ourselves, and thereby to
balance the power of Russia in the Baltic. With respect to
Poland on the other hand, we have nothing to expect from it
even during the life -time of King Stanislaus;131 for as long as
the war is carried on, no support can come from it, because
it is too much exhausted ; and if there should be peace, even
then we should not be able to profit much by it, inasmuch as
peace and tranquillity would only last during his life-time, and
afterwards things would return to their former condition. With
respect to Dantzic, naval and other powers in time will so
arrange it, that Russia will not enjoy its possession perpetually.
Should Russia, however, by some good fortune, become still
more powerful, and Sweden less able to defend herself, we
have, nevertheless, always been able to defend ourselves hitherto.
But if Russia should still more enlarge and become more
powerful, we should be more surely enabled to withstand
Russia, by the advantage of neutrality, than by an opposite
course. [Nos. 13 to 16 are wanting.)
17. With respect to any conjuncture in Russia itself, if it
should apparently be favourable to us, the reins are nevertheless
held so tightly there, that not much can be expected from
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