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i9i6] M. WALLENBERG’S CLEVER POLICY 417
subject and handed it to the Swedish Foreign Secretary,
but on condition that he was to communicate it to
Parliament; in the event of his considering it
inopportune to do so, he was to return the document to me and
look on it as a verbal communication. M. Wallenberg
was quite satisfied with the contents of the document,
which he showed—as I heard later—to all the influential
members of the Riksdag; but he did not wish to
communicate it officially to this assembly and returned it to
me as had been arranged.
At a certain moment I thought it incumbent on me
to address a private and very friendly but most serious
letter to M. Wallenberg, dealing with the dangerous
activities of certain parliamentarians and of certain
organs of the Swedish Press. This letter, much
approved of by my colleagues, was worded so that
the Minister could submit it to the King and to the
political personages in view—which Wallenberg made a
point of doing.
Finally the Minister for Foreign Affairs made detailed
declarations at the Riksdag with respect to the questions
which seemed to be affecting the Assembly so strongly.
He did so with much frankness and at the same time
very cleverly, for he persisted in not communicating the
statements coming from the Entente Governments and
which would have proved in black and white that the
fears of the country were exaggerated, to say the least of
it. At the time my colleagues and I wondered why
the Swedish Government thus persisted in not "
showing their vouchers." I discovered later that neither
M. Hammarskiold nor M. Wallenberg himself wished to
create a precedent by virtue of which the Riksdag might
demand the communication of certain statements of
German origin. Now the communication of the latter
might excite anger in Berlin, and as I have said the
Swedish Government did not feel sure enough of the final
victory of the Entente to risk drawing down on itself the
vengeance of Germany.
M. Wallenberg’s declarations were received at the
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