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Full resolution (TIFF) - On this page / på denna sida - IV. Economics - 19. The War Boom—and Thereafter - 5. ... And Afterwards?
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Chapter 19. The War Boom—^and Thereafter 425
have been employed in armament factories during the War will most
certainly resent finding Negroes in their old jobs. In the long run, it is
rather unfortunate that the present efforts to integrate the Negro into
war production have been based, in part, on the motivation that these are
unusual times when all kinds of hardships have to be accepted. It is quite
probable that this particular kind of motivation will backfire. The same may
be true, to an extent, about the argument that Negroes should be given
some attention since this country cannot afford to feed the German and the
Japanese propaganda machines.
It is not even certain that the leaders of the C.I.O. unions who are
friendly to the Negroes will be able to maintain discipline respecting non-
discrimination among their rank-and-file membership. During the War the
union leaders have alienated themselves from the mass of the members,
to a certain extent, by siding with the Administration’s anti-strike policy.
Although their present difficulties may be due, in part, to the large num-
ber of new members, many of whom will perhaps drop out after the
War, it is quite possible that they may have to face the alternative of either
following the rank-and-filers’ anti-Negro attitude or being exchanged for
new leaders.
For the period immediately following the War, however, the risk of
widespread unemployment may not be great. Those first years will probably
be characterized by a large demand for durable consumers’ goods, like
automobiles, refrigerators, stoves and possibly airplanes. The reconstruc-
tion work overseas may constitute another significant source of demand for
American products. Sometime, however, a really large post-war unemploy-
ment will threaten the entire economic system. It will be largely counter-
acted, however, by government policies. It is true that unemployment
policies during the last depression were not entirely successful; but that
was largely because they started too late, and because they constituted the
first large-scale attempt of this type in the United States. This time there
will be much more rational and experienced planning behind these efforts.
The post-war planning work carried on by governmental and other agencies
at the present time is extensive.^^ In part it may be somewhat unco-
ordinated, but certainly many useful things are being done.®
*It seems, however, that there is reason to warn against over-optimism regarding the
success of the policies during the next depression. One often hears the argument that post-
war unemployment will not be dangerous at all “since it will be prevented by planning”
—
just as if this were a perfectly simple thing, or even that the word “planning” would have
a magical effect. Yet planning, of course, is never of much use just because it is planning
^
it is of use only in so far as it is well adapted to the specific problems.
It is quite probable, for instance, that the next depression, to an even greater extent than
the last one, will be characterized by structural changes requiring something more than just
depression fighting, pump priming, temporary public works. There is always the danger that
our planning will fit the last depression more perfectly than the one ahead. Moreover, it is
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