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Full resolution (TIFF) - On this page / på denna sida - Appendices - 10. Quantitative Studies of Race Attitudes - 2. The Empirical Study of Valuations and Beliefs
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1138 An American Dilemma
plete or incomplete; (2) valuations of an actual or hypothetical reality which can vary
in intensity, clarity, and homogeneity but in themselves are neither complete nor incom-
plete, neither true nor untrue. There are, of course, opinions, which are only beliefs
or only valuations. But more usually, opinions are combinations of both: on the one
hand, beliefs are, as we have seen, nearly always influenced by the valuations for which
they serve as rationalizations (which in logical terms means that they are “biased”), and,
on the other hand, beliefs influence valuations.
Reacting to the earlier schools of rationalistic psychology, we became several decades
ago so impressed by the fact that people did not act and think rationally that something
of a tradition became established not to split opinions into two components relating to
the cognitive and to the volitional sides of mental processes. This is part of the back-
ground for the present loose usage of the word “attitude” as a scientific term.® In many
questionnaires one finds questions concerning knowledge, concerning almost pure valua-
tions, and concerning both combined—^all these three types mixed together without
much distinction. And the subsequent analysis does not take into account the difference
between them. Such a differentiation is of great importance, however, since a study
of people’s beliefs throws light not only on what they know or do not know but, in
addition, on the structure of their entire valuation sphere.
The fact that people’s beliefs, unlike their valuations, can be directly judged by the
objective criteria of correctness and completeness offers us a clue for analyzing scientif-
ically the complexes of struggling valuations that exist in the minds of people. It is a
sound hypothesis that, since the beliefs of men serve an opportunistic function, both
the direction and the degree of their deviation from “objective” knowledge will tell
us how people are trying to reconcile their valuations on a lower plane, implicit in their
daily behavior, with the more general valuations which are recognized as morally higher
in our society. From this point of view, it becomes of great importance to chart quanti-
tatively people’s knowledge and ignorance on controversial subjects. For this purpose
the questions to be utilized in certain types of opinion studies should be purged as far
as possible of all valuations; they should only test the respondent’s conception of this
particular part of reality. It is fairly easy to prepare a standard norm of what represents
objective knowledge; in the many problems where we are still ignorant or hesitant,
consciousness of our ignorance constitutes true knowledge. For testing knowledge as to
its degree of completeness, some sort of graduated scale can be worked out with the
help of available techniques.
If properly carried out, such a study of factual knowledge regarding the Negro
problem—differentiated in relation to certain main axes: white-Negro, North-South,
urban-rural, social class, education, sex, age—^would be revealing. Its practical impor-
tance for education is obvious. It will also have great theoretical importance in explain-
ing white people’s behavior with respect to Negroes. The hypothesis is that we are not
facing a question merely of more or less meager and incorrect knowledge. There is an
emotional load of valuation conflicts pressing for rationalization, creating certain blind
spots—^and also creating a desire for knowledge in other spots—^and in general causing
conceptions of reality to deviate from truth in determined directions. If such an
analysis of the degree of knowledge and ignorance and also of their localization and
•As used by Thomas and Znaniecki in The Polish Peasant^ the term “attitude’* was a
part of the reaction to the complete irrationalism emphasized by the instinctivist and
behaviorist schools.
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